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Abstract 
Digital investigators often get involved with cases which seemingly point the responsibility to the 
person to which the computer belongs, but after a thorough examination malware is proven to be 
the cause, causing loss of precious time. Whilst Anti-Virus (AV) software can assist the investigator in 
identifying the presence of malware, with the increase in zero-day attacks and errors that exist in AV 
tools, this is something that cannot be relied upon. The aim of this paper is to investigate the behavior 
of malware upon various Windows operating system versions in order to determine and correlate the 
relationship between malicious software and OS artifacts. This will enable an investigator to be more 
efficient in identifying the presence of new malware and provide a starting point for further 
investigation.   
The study analyzed several versions of the Windows operating systems (Windows 7, 8.1 and 10) and 
monitored the interaction of 90 samples of malware across three categories of the most prevalent 
(Trojan, Worm, and Bot) and 90 benign samples through the Windows Registry. Analysis of the 
interactions has provided a rich source of knowledge about how various forms of malware interact 
with key areas of the Registry. Using this knowledge, the study sought to develop an approach to 
predict the presence and type of malware present through an analysis of the Registry. To this end, 
different classifiers such as Neural Network, Random forest, Decision tree, Boosted tree and Logistic 
Regression were tested. It was observed that Boosted tree was resulting in a correct classification of 
over 72% – providing the investigator with a simple approach to determining which type of malware 
might be present independent and faster than an Antivirus. The modeling of these findings and their 
integration in an application or forensic analysis within an existing tool would be useful for digital 
forensic investigators.  
Keywords: Digital Forensics, Malware, Machine Learning, Registry Hives, Windows Registry, Windows 7/8/10, 
Sandbox, Agentless Sandbox, Cuckoo 
1. Introduction 
As malware evolves and becomes more complex, malicious attackers are able to adapt their behavior 
depending on the system they wish to infect. Malicious software can only be revealed after the 
recognition of specific factors of the system and the combination of many parameters and conditions. 
For example, a particular malware might reveal it’s behavior when installing on a Windows 7 platform 
or when specific software is installed on the victim's computer (for example a PDF Reader) and to 
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remain totally inactive in any other situation. Similarly, it can reveal a part of his behavior, while parts 
of the functionality remain hidden until certain conditions that will cause additional activity. Attempts 
have been made to uncover malware activated behavior (Moser et al., 2007; Brumley et al., 2008) 
but it has also shown for it to be possible to trick such analyzers (Sharif et al., 2008).  During the 
examination of a case, the possibility always exists that digital evidence or criminal activity is the 
result of malware activity. It could be that the owner of a computer system is unjustly suspected due 
to the presence of malicious software. Therefore, in each case prior to the recording of evidence, a 
thorough investigation for the presence of malware should be undertaken. Traditionally, this is 
achieved using one or more Anti-Virus (AV) systems. However, weaknesses in AV technology and the 
increasing presence of zero-day vulnerabilities make them less than full-proof. 
Many researchers have conducted studies to find digital artifacts on the Windows operating system, 
including earlier versions of Windows, were analyzed, such as Vista (Purcell and Lang, 2008), 7 
(Thomas et al., 2013) and 8 (Stormo, 2013). Further research has also been undertaken on the study 
of specific operating regions such as the Registry (Mee et al., 2006), volatile memory (Schuster, 2006; 
Dolan-Gavitt, 2008; Thomas et al., 2013; Shanks, 2014), USB devices (Carvey and Altheide, 2005; Collie 
2013) and the file system (Carrier, 2005; Carvey, 2009; Malicious-streams, 2014). In this research work 
a comparative study of three core Windows OSs (Windows 7, 8.1 and 10) is undertaken in order to 
study whether the version of OS has an impact over the behavior and performance of malicious 
software. This will provide digital forensics analysts with invaluable help, as they will have a guide for 
the locations to which are expected to have digital evidence. With a targeted investigation at specific 
locations, it is possible to identify whether a system is infected with malware or not. The paper also 
develops and evaluates an approach to automatically predict which type of malware is present. This 
allows forensic examiners to more quickly and reliably identify the presence and type of malware. 
2. Background and Related Work 
The detection of malware through an analysis of unknown executables is not a new problem. 
Consequently, many solutions already exist. These solutions can be divided into two categories: static 
and dynamic analysis. 
2.1. Static Analysis 
In static analysis, an incident response team analyzes the code or the structure of a program to 
determine the functionality without running the program (Sikorski and Honig, 2012). First steps 
include the use of all available anti-virus programs. This could give information to a known malware 
for which signature is available, saving valuable time in the process. A major disadvantage of this 
technique is the dependence upon the detection of the virus based largely on file signatures. 
Malicious code developers can easily change the code in order to avoid detection (Dalziel, 2014). 
Another technique used in the static analysis is binary code disassembling, which converts the binary 
code into an assembly and then analytical techniques control data flow resulting in a report of the 
running program. A series of binary code analysis techniques (Christodorescu and Jha, 2003; Kruegel, 
et al. 2004; Christodorescu et al., 2005) have been presented for the detection of different types of 
malware. The advantage of static analysis is that it’s carried out quickly and that can cover the entire 
application code. Whilst, there is rich literature on static analysis techniques, which indicates that 
many problems can be tackled well in practice due to predictability, often this is because it is being 
applied to real applications rather than malware. Unfortunately, since malware is directly created by 
cyber criminals it can be deliberately crafted so that it is difficult to analyze. Specifically, the attacker 
can make use of technical binary obfuscation to prevent both the disassembly of the code and 
analysis, methods which are used by static analysis techniques.  
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2.2. Dynamic Analysis 
The dynamic analysis techniques of malware behavior characterized by the analysis of the actual 
instructions of a program or the results it brings the program to the operating system. Compared with 
the static approach, dynamic analysis is less susceptible to various code obfuscation techniques 
(Moser et al., 2007). Christodorescu et al., (2007) introduce the specifications of malware using data 
flows between the system calls. They found the actual relationships between system calls are difficult 
to overcome with random system calls. Since then, this knowledge of malicious software has been 
widely used in malware analysis tasks such as extraction of distinct malware functions, mining the 
difference between malware behaviour and benign behaviour of the program (Fredrikson et al., 
2010), determining malware families in which samples are sharing common functions (Bayer et al., 
2009; Babić et al., 2011; Park et al., 2013) and to detect malicious behaviour ( Lippmann and Clark., 
2008; Kolbitsch et al., 2009; Bayer et al., 2010). Another method uses a representative audience 
behavior chart for all samples of malware in a family, instead of a behavior chart per case. The 
proposed approach is valid and effective since most new malware variants are from known families 
(Gordon, 1997; Park et al., 2010; Vlachos et al., 2012). Despite various metamorphic and polymorphic 
blackouts, samples of malicious software within the same family tend to reveal similar malicious 
behavior (Lindorfer et al., 2012).  
The most popular method of analyzing the malware operation in a safe way is to use sandbox 
technology. The sandbox is running as a separate system, contains the untrusted program and 
prevents any action from accessing the real network and often provides network services for malware 
in a form of "black hole." If the untrusted program makes a DNS request, for example, the sandbox 
will answer the question, usually with 127.0.0.1 (loopback). 
Since the spread of metamorphic and polymorphic viruses, dynamic analysis of malware has been 
established as an effective approach to understanding and classifying malware by observing the 
execution of malware samples in quarantine environment (Willems et al., 2007; Egele et al., 2012). 
The interaction between the execution of the malicious sample and operating system allows dynamic 
malware analysis systems to collect those behavioral characteristics that help shape technical 
defense.  
A problem that was found in modern viruses is that the malicious code is often equipped with 
detection routines that check for the presence of a virtual machine or a simulated operating system 
environment. When such an environment is detected, the malware modifies its behavior and the 
analysis yields incorrect results or even worst, the malware stops to function making analysis 
impossible. Moreover, some malware also checks for software (even material) having breakpoints to 
detect whether the program is running in a debug program. In order to bypass the aforementioned 
problems, the analysis environment should be invisible to malicious code, comprehensive and cover 
all aspects of the interaction of an environmental program. 
Efforts to investigate the possible prevention of malware incidents have prompted earlier studies on 
malicious codes (Balthrop et al., 2004; Costa et al., 2005; Zou et al., 2007). Current research in 
cybersecurity focuses on the characterization and modeling of specific attacks, with the aim of 
understanding the mechanisms of penetration, detection, and response. As cyber threats are 
increased both in number and in complexity, it has increased the interest in infectious malware (Liu 
et al., 2016). In theory, one of the interesting issues is the creation of reliable mathematical models 
that can be applied to effectively describe and forecast the evolution of malicious computer software. 
Since the spread of malicious code is similar to the biological epidemics (Vespignani, 2005), some 
epidemiological models have been employed to study the behavior of malicious software (Cheng et 
al., 2011; Li et al., 2014; Mishra and Pandey, 2014; Misra et al., 2014; Shukla et al., 2014). In addition, 
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new strategies and methodologies necessary to prevent invasions and addressing their effects (Gil et 
al., 2014). 
3. Experimental Methodology 
The purpose of this research was to examine in a dead-box mode the impact that malware has on the 
Windows Registry. Furthermore, the research sought to understand what differences exist in differing 
versions of the OS. To this end, 90 samples of both malware (split between Trojans, worms, and bot) 
and cleanware were selected to provide a robust and comprehensive analysis. The Microsoft’s 
Windows operating systems was focussed upon as, it is still the prominent OS in use today 
(NetMarketShare, 2016).  
3.1 Virtual lab 
The analysis laboratory consists of two testbeds. The first one is running locally on a host machine 
with a CPU Intel Core i7-4790, 16 GB RAM and Windows 10 Pro is the bare metal configuration. In 
this machine we installed VMware Workstation Pro 12 (VMware, 2016) and virtual Ubuntu 16.04 
operating system which hosted the Cuckoo Sandbox. Ubuntu compatibility of the Cuckoo Sandbox 
(Oktavianto and Muhardianto, 2013) is excellent and has been used by other investigators (Shanks, 
2014) for the same purpose.  
 
 
Figure 1: Virtual lab architect 
 
Furthermore, three virtual machines were created with the following characteristics: CPU a core of 
the Intel Core i7-4790, 2 GB RAM and Operating System Windows. In each of these three virtual 
machines installed a different version of Windows, specifically 7, 8.1 and 10. In order to communicate 
the Cuckoo with each operating to be tested, one of Cuckoo network card and unique virtual 
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Windows machine card, connected to a virtual isolated network (192.168.56.0/24) as shown in Figure 
2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Virtual network configuration 
The script (in Python) and the libraries are Cuckoo’s important components (Hosmer, 2014). The 
system consists of a server where the Cuckoo software installed, a virtualization program such as 
Oracle VirtualBox (Dash, 2013) and the Cuckoo agent that runs in a virtual machine. A guest system 
is a virtual machine that is running one of the Windows versions. This virtual machine has turned off 
the User Account Control (UAC), automatic updates and firewall. 
A methodology for the understanding malicious code is based upon sandboxing (Greamo and Ghosh, 
2011). In simple terms, the process involves the execution of arbitrary code in a controlled manner 
that allows direct observation of results. By documenting evidence, such as open ports, registry keys, 
IP addresses, file incorporated and domain names, a team can gain information on the regular 
opponent. 
The isolated environment allows the sample to run without adversely affecting the system host 
computer or the quest. Once the desired state of the system has accomplished, a system snapshot is 
taken. This snapshot can be used to restore the system to a known clean state after the sample is 
analyzed. A command line interface used to all commands executed within Cuckoo Sandbox. 
The second testbed was hosted on cloud and we used two cloud sandboxes to withdraw as much 
information as possible in order to find more unique registry hives from the malware and cleanware. 
For this experiment we utilised an Agentless (VMRay Analyzer) and AI-based (SNDBOX) sandbox. 
VMRay Analyser as aforementioned is an agentless sandbox cloud solution and the reason choosing 
this platform is that some sophisticate malware usually monitor the running environment and to 
prevent their discovery they usually stop their execution which provides insignificant features to the 
analysis (Ali et al., 2018). SNDBOX applies an invisible kernel mode agent and AI to offer the next 
generation Sandbox, extending the individual capabilities and expertise of security and research 
teams through AI, dynamic analysis and network mapping. It is Located between the User mode and 
Kernel mode, SNDBOX’s invisible agent deceives malware into executing its full range of intended 
functionality, revealing its true malicious nature, intent, and capabilities (“SNDBOX,” 2019).  
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3.2 Standardized naming scheme for malware 
Security analysts and researchers from different AV companies in 1991 developed a standardized 
naming scheme for malware known as Computer Antivirus Research Organization (CARO) (“A New 
Virus Naming Convention (1991) - CARO - Computer Antivirus Research Organization,” n.d.). The 
philosophy behind the development of this standard is to remove the confusion among the users 
and AV-Vendors by having a common standard or syntax for naming malware. The generic form of 
this format is mentioned below  
<malware type>://<platform>/<family name>.<group name>.<infective length>.<sub-
variant><devolution><modifiers> 
In the string above only family name is compulsory and the rest of the fields are optional. Although 
most companies claim that they follow the CARO scheme, but in practice only Microsoft is using this 
convention in their AV software for MSE or the Win8 version and windows defender etc. 
                                                 
Figure 3: CARO malware naming scheme (“Malware names | Microsoft Docs,” n.d.) 
In this research work we used the CARO naming scheme to name malware as shown in section 3.3 
3.3 Malware samples used 
Often, malware investigators have to deal new threats and unknown executable. In some cases, there 
are scenarios where you can handle malware that already knows its name and is classified, e.g. for 
research purposes as in this work. To analyze such malicious software, there are many places where 
one researcher can collect known samples. The Lenny Zeltser, who is the head of the private SANS 
Institute (SANS, 2016), recommends several free resources on his website (Zeltser, 2016). The 
samples of malicious code used in this research were taken from Malware.lu (Malware.lu, 2016), 
Virussign (VirusSign, 2016), Vx Heaven (VxHeaven, 2016), Malekal (Malekal, 2016) and MalwareTips 
(MalwareTips, 2016). Ninety samples of malicious code were selected, 20 Trojan, 20 Worms, and 20 
Bot. These three malware families were selected (table 1) as they are the main categories that are 
detected more often (Veracode, 2012; AlienVault, 2013; Malwaretruth, 2016). 
Table 1: The malware samples that were used 
 Category Virus name SPY- 
STEAL DATA 
C&C BACKDOOR STEALTH 
1 Trojan Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot.wijf X X   
2 Trojan Trojan.GenericKD.3015891  X   
3 Trojan Trojan.GenericKD.3015909   X  
4 Trojan Trojan/Win32.Yakes   X  
5 Trojan Trojan.GenericKD.3016131   X  
6 Trojan Trojan/W32.KRBanker  X   
7 Trojan Trojan-Spy.Win32.FlyStudio.ij   X X 
8 Trojan Trojan-
Dropper.Win32.Injector.nyds 
  X  
Backdoor 
Type 
Win32/ 
Platform 
Hupigon. .D 
.variant 
!nk 
!information 
Backdoor.Win32/ Hupigon.D!nk 
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9 Trojan Trojan.Zboter X X   
10 Trojan Trojan-Spy.Win32.Recam.yue X X   
11 Trojan Trojan. Tesla!1.A322  X  X 
12 Trojan Trojan.Win32.Waldek.cbp   X  
13 Trojan Trojan.Win32.Waldek.cbm   X  
14 Trojan Trojan.Win32.Dridex.v X X  X 
15 Trojan Trojan.Win32.Tepfer.psxezj X X   
16 Trojan Trojan.Win32.Yakes.owmp   X  
17 Trojan Trojan.Win32.KeyLogger.auqd X    
18 Trojan Trojan.GenericKD.3023498  X   
19 Trojan Trojan.Generic.8742442 X X  X 
20 Trojan Trojan.Generic.7738292 X    
21 Trojan Trojan.Generic. 
AAA._xeDropperSpywareTrojan 
X X   
22 Trojan Trojan.Generic .Badi X X  X 
23 Trojan Trojan.Win32.CretClient.exe     
24 Trojan Trojan.Generic .InstallBC201401  X   
25  Trojan.Generic.pony X    
26  Trojan.Generic.Potao_Droppers
wdecoy 
   X 
27  Trojan.Win32.zeus X X X X 
28 Trojan Trojan.Generic.kotbjxfkzeq X    
29 Trojan Trojan.Generic.Locky X X  X 
30 Trojan Trojan. Win32.njRAT.exe X X  X 
31 Trojan Trojan.Generic.pafish X    
32 Trojan Trojan.Win32win32.duqu     
33 Trojan Trojan.Generic.Cerber.exe    X 
34 Trojan Trojan. Win32Mole.exe    X 
35 Trojan Trojan. Win32.Spora.exe    X 
36 Trojan Trojan.Win32GrandCrab-01.exe    X 
37 Trojan Trojan. Win32.Delf.xo   X  
38 Trojan Trojan. Win32.DarkTequila.exe     
39 Trojan Trojan. Win32.psiphon.exe X    
40 Trojan Trojan.Generic.yigzwl    X 
41 Trojan Trojan.Generic.Vcffipzmnipbxzdl    X 
42 Worm Win32.Gamarue X X  X 
43 Worm W32.Cridex.A.worm X X  X 
44 Worm Worm.VBS.Agent  X   
45 Worm Worm.Win32.3DStars   X X 
46 Worm Worm.Generic3.PEM   X  
47 Worm Worm.Win32.Mira.A X    
48 Worm Worm.Generic2.CMVO X    
49 Worm Worm.Win32.Cake    X 
50 Worm Worm.Win32.Fever X   X 
51 Worm Worm.Win32.Monkey.exe X    
52 Worm Worm.Win32.Mydoom.a.exe   X X 
53 Worm Worm.Win32.Pikachu.exe X    
54 Worm Worm.Win32.Postman.exe    X 
55 Worm Worm.Win32.Sharpei.a.exe    X 
56 Worm Worm.Win32.Silver.exe    X 
57 Worm Worm.Win32.Sobig.exe X X   
58 Worm Worm.KOOBFCE.SMC X  X  
 8 
59 Worm W32/Wabot X X   
60 Worm Worm.vid.exe X    
61 Worm Email-Worm.Win32.Mydoom.l   X X 
62 Worm Email-Worm.Win32.Naked X    
63 Worm Worm.Christmas-wishes.doc X    
64 Worm Win32.WannaCry.EXE X  X X 
65 Worm Win32.F7F105F9.exe     
66 Worm Win32.2tetup.exe X    
67 Worm Win32.GrandCrab-01.exe X    
68 Worm Win32.GlobeImposter.exe X    
69 Botnet Win32.Lolbot.aoi   X  
70 Botnet WORM/IrcBot.tlq X X X  
71 Botnet W32.Jorik_Lolbot.O!tr X  X  
72 Botnet Win32.SdBot.aamk X X X  
73 Botnet W32.ZBot.42352 X  X X 
74 Botnet Win32.Jorik.SdBot.e   X  
75 Botnet MSIL.NanoBot.ibh   X  
76 Botnet Win32.Zbot.vtii X  X X 
77 Botnet Win32.Ngrbot.anak    X 
78 Botnet Win32.Alinaos.G X X   
79 Botnet GenericKD.2143403   X  
80 Botnet Win32/ChkBot.A   X  
81 Botnet MSIL/Lizarbot.A X X X  
82 Botnet Win32.Jorik.Lolbot.f X X X  
83 Botnet Win32.Zbot.sbdj X  X X 
84 Botnet MSIL.NanoBot.bi X  X  
85 Botnet Win32.Ngrbot.uyk    X 
86 Botnet Win32.Boht.qo  X X  
87 Botnet W32/Zbot.AJJU!tr X  X X 
88 Botnet Win32.VBInject    X 
89 Botnet Trickbot  X   
90 Botnet obfuscated.js   X  
3.4 Clean samples used 
As we wanted to differentiate the clean registry hives from malicious hives cleanware samples such 
as chrome, teamviewer, skype etc were collected and analysed. During the analysis we also give 
emphasis to collect system changes along with register hives in order to have more information. 
The table below shows the samples used as well as the type of each sample. 
Table 2: The cleanware samples that were used 
 Category Sample name Type 
1 Normal grammarlyaddinsetup.pe32 Application software plug 
2 Normal Poweriso6-x64. Executable  
3 Normal Vlc-2-2-1-win32 Executable 
4 Normal Wireshark-win64-2.6.5 Executable 
5 Normal ProtonVPN.exe Executable 
6 Normal Notepad.exe Executable 
7 Normal McAfeeWebAdvisor.exe Executable 
8 Normal Putty2.exe Executable 
9 Normal FTPDesktopClient.exe Executable 
10 Normal SQLiteStudio-3.2.1.exe Executable 
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11 Normal KeePass-2.40-Setup Executable 
12 Normal LinuxLiveUSB Creator 2.9.4.exe Executable 
13 Normal flashplayer32_install.exe Executable 
14 Normal Firefox Setup 14.0.1 Executable 
15 Normal 7za.EXE Executable 
16 Normal GoogleUpdateSetup.exe Executable 
17 Normal Epson512523eu.exe Executable 
18 Normal Microsoft-Toolkit.exe Executable 
19 Normal Googlewebdesigner_win.exe Executable 
20 Normal PDFSAM_Installer.exe Executable 
21 Normal FoxitReader_Setup.exe Executable 
22 Normal TeamViewer_Setup.exe Executable 
23 Normal Internet.Download.Manager.exe Executable 
24 Normal TrueCrypt.exe Executable 
25 Normal SkypeSetup.exe Executable 
26 Normal HottNotes4.1Setup.exe Executable 
27 Normal TorchSetup Executable 
28 Normal GitHubDesktopSetup Executable 
29 Normal Nektar Bolt v1.0 CE.exe Executable 
30 Normal ForkInstaller.exe Executable 
31 Normal hashcat32.exe Executable 
32 Normal AdobePatchInstaller.exe Executable 
33 Normal TWUploader.exe Executable 
34 Normal vmnat.exe Executable 
35 Normal SenseDriver.exe Executable 
36 Normal ISSetup.dll DLL  
37 Normal SrvCtl.dll Executable 
38 Normal panfinder.exe Executable 
39 Normal strings.exe Executable 
40 Normal procexp.exe Executable 
41 Normal cbhqgi.vbs vbs 
42 Normal acc.exe Executable 
43 Normal KutoolsforExcelSetup.exe Executable 
44 Normal DTools.exe Executable 
45 Normal winsdk_web.exe Executable 
46 Normal ClipboardHistory.exe Executable 
47 Normal MEGAsync.exe Executable 
48 Normal AnyDesk.exe Executable 
49 Normal npp.7.6.Installer.exe Executable 
50 Normal CVHP.exe Executable 
51 Normal WinSCP-5.13.6-Setup.exe Executable 
52 Normal coreftplite64.exe Executable 
53 Normal eagleget_setup.exe Executable 
54 Normal NetAssemblyInfo.exe Executable 
55 Normal Morgan Spencer.htm htm 
56 Normal fdminst-lite.exe Executable 
57 Normal sigcheck.exe Executable 
58 Normal RBInternetEncodings500.dll DLL  
59 Normal cryptolibcps-5.0.43.exe Executable 
60 Normal Trustlook PDF 
61 Normal shell.hta Executable 
62 Normal rufus-usb-3-3.exe Executable 
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63 Normal photosync_setup.exe Executable 
64 Normal Home Sweet Home 2 - Kitchens 
and Baths.exe 
Executable 
65 Normal ThrottleStop.exe Executable 
66 Normal Portal.2.incl.upd30-NSIS.exe Executable 
67 Normal libeay32.dll Executable 
68 Normal PwDump7.exe Executable 
69 Normal UaInstall-7.0.6-4.msi MSI 
70 Normal TP8-2019.exe Executable 
71 Normal tlscntr.exe Executable 
72 Normal cccredmgr.exe Executable 
73 Normal fdminst-lite.exe Executable 
74 Normal HoMM3_HD_Latest.exe Executable 
75 Normal ILSpy.exe Executable 
76 Normal AnyDesk.exe Executable 
77 Normal vs_community__1072350829.15
45770560.exe 
Executable 
78 Normal winsdk_web.exe Executable 
79 Normal KutoolsforExcelSetup.exe Executable 
80 Normal acc.exe Executable 
81 Normal cbhqgi.vbs VBS 
82 Normal PDFsam_Basic3_3_Installer.exe Executable 
83 Normal A_info.pdf PDF 
84 Normal Angry Birds.exe Executable 
85 Normal aspcmd.msi MSI 
86 Normal Research_Paper1.pdf PDF 
87 Normal SupportAssistLauncher.exe Executable 
88 Normal meda-mp3-joiner-install.exe Executable 
89 Normal AutoCopyFiles.exe Executable 
90 Normal soffice.exe Executable 
   
3.5 Sandbox Analysis Procedure 
To export information from the samples we performed experiments in three different environments. 
In the first experiment, Cuckoo was utilised for behavior analysis of malware of files mentioned in 
section 3.3. and 3.4 above. For each analysis request, a separate subfolder containing all the reports 
is produced with raw logs, .pcap files, images and any other information obtained during the analysis. 
Using the Cuckoo as the main malicious software analysis tool, each sample was studied in three 
different software environments (Windows 7, 8.1 and 10) and the results of the analysis are stored 
in a suitable form for further study and analysis. 
The program sends the sample to the virtual machine that we have selected in the settings file. When 
injection of the sample into the operating system has completed successfully, Cuckoo monitors all 
system activity and records it. Once the analysis of the virtual machine is terminated, the .html file 
with the report of the analysis is created. 
The second experiment was completed in two different cloud sandboxes named VMRay analyzer and 
SNDBOX. In both these sandboxes, benign and malicious samples of section 3.3. and 3.4 respective 
were executed. For each analysis request, a separate subfolder containing all the reports is produced, 
the raw logs, .pcap files, images, JSON and any other information obtained during the analysis.  
3.5.1 Dataset preparation  
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Data constitute the input/output variables required to make a prediction. Usually, data comes in two 
forms either structured or unstructured data. In this research we have taken structure data which 
implies that data are defined and properly labeled. In order to label data VIT and Virus Total 
reputation scoring were introduced, to categorize samples as malicious and benign. VirusTotal 
inspects items with over 70 antivirus scanners database along with URL/domain blacklisting services, 
in addition to a myriad of tools to extract signals from the studied (“VirusTotal,” n.d.). Cuckoo sandbox 
uses VirusTotal to perform the experiments, moreover, in the case of VMRay analyzer VTI score is 
used to label the samples. 
To evaluate the proposed research and create the raw and integrated feature set, malware and 
benign samples were collected from a different source as mentioned in the above section. In order 
to validate the propose works different portion of samples were taken for validation purpose.  
3.6 Pre-processing and feature generation 
In this stage data were processed and cleaned from noise and irrelevant entries and string 
information was extracted from the logs file generated by the different sandboxes and features set 
were constructed. In this research, 34 register hives were identified for malware and 13 register hives 
for cleanware as shown in the Table 2. Furthermore, these strings were converted into binary feature 
vector, so they can be given as input to the machine learning algorithm.  
4. Experimental Results 
During the analysis of malware, some locations in the registry and in the Windows file system, have 
been recognized as important for potential contamination data. Based upon prior work, the following 
locations were recorded (as illustrated in table 2) (Symantec, 2009; Norton, 2010; Carvey, 2011; Cert-
Eu, 2012; RSA, 2013; Bayer et al., 2014; Horsman et al., 2014; Malicious-streams, 2014; Fnal, 2016):  
Table 3: The locations were investigated for digital forensics 
 Digital forensics locations 
1 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls\CustomLocale\en-US  
2 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls 
3 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SESSION 
4 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control 
5 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM 
6 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Rpc 
7 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion 
8 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ 
9 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\ 
10 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows 
11 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Setup 
12 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall 
13 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ 
14 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer 
15 Documents and Settings\[user name]\Start Menu\Programs\Startup 
16 %systemdrive%\Documents and Settings\[User Name]\Local Settings\Temp  
17 %Systemdrive%\Users\victim_user\AppData\ 
18 %Systemdrive%\Windows\System32 
19 %Systemdrive%\Windows\INF\ 
20 %Systemdrive%\Windows\Globalization\Sorting\sortdefault.nls 
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21 %Systemdrive%\ 
22 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\policies 
23 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\ 
24 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft   
25 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders 
26 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\explorer\UserShell 
27 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices 
28 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\exefile\shell\open\command 
29 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\comfile\shell\open\command 
30 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\CLASSES\batfile\shell\open\command 
31 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\CLASSES\exefile\shell\open\command 
32 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell 
33 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\KeyName 
34 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ 
Advanced\Start_ShowDownloads 
35 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop 
36 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE \SOFTWARE\Classes\Interface 
37 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\software_name 
38 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet 
Settings\ZoneMapKey 
39 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\Software_name 
40 HKEY_USERS\% account id %\Software\Adobe\ 
41 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes 
42 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\software_name 
43 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\appmanagement\arpcache\ 
44 %Systemdrive%\Users\Public\Documents 
45 %systemdrive%\Program Files\Software_name\ 
46 %SYSTEMDRIVE%\Windows\Fonts 
47 %Systemdrive%\Users\Public\Documents 
 
 
Figure 4: The ratio of clean and malicious hives. 
The following sub-sections present an analysis of the findings based on three perspectives:  
• The purpose/payload/motivation of the malware (e.g. spying or command and control) 
• The type of malware (i.e. Bot, Trojan or Worm) 
• The version of the operating system (i.e. Windows 7, 8, or 10) 
In each case, the previously identified 47 registry and file locations are analyzed against the 90 
samples of both malware and cleanware to proof our initial research question. The raw results from 
the analysis derive can be found in Appendix A. 
clean Malicious
Total 13 34
0
50
Count of Features by the Type
 13 
4.1 Analysis of Malware Motivation 
The first analysis is concerned with the research question, whether the motivation of the malware 
affected the frequency of digital evidence in a particular position within the Registry. As previously 
identified in Table 2, the types of functionality include: 
• Spying and/or steal user data (Trojan) 
• Communicating with a control center to receive commands (Botnet) 
• Self-Propagation (Worm) 
• Benign file 
Figure 5- 7 illustrate the degree to which the registry locations are affected. The analysis focussed 
upon an analysis of the registry against the type of malware. Figure 4(a-c) illustrate the proportion of 
each type of malware upon the 34 Registry locations. The significant register keys/values for malware 
and benign values are mentioned below  
Values for Malware 
It has been observed that few hives values are of significant importance when the forensic 
investigator is looking for malicious activities in the system. The modification of P2, P17, P3, P18 and 
P1 are higher in proportion as compared to other counterpart, although P17, P18 were also present 
in Bots and Trojan but other keys impact and modification is higher in malware as compared to them. 
• P2 (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls ) , 
• P17 - %Systemdrive%\Users\victim_user\AppData\ 
• P3 -HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SESSION  
• P18 - %Systemdrive%\Windows\System32 
• P1-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls\CustomLocale\en-US   
 
 
Figure 5: The Impact of Malware on the Registry 
 
An analysis of the Figure 5 and Figure 9 (cleanware) shows that Malware has a slightly different profile in 
many cases to that of Bots, Trojans, and Worms. For example, Bot has distinctive impacts in the following 
locations: P1, P2, P8, P13, P17, P18 
Values for Bots 
In the case of bots, the Modification of below-mentioned keys are of indicative of bots activities, the 
detail of these keys are mentioned below 
• P18 – %Systemdrive%\Windows\System32 
• P8 - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ 
• P19 – %Systemdrive%\Windows\INF\ 
• P17-%Systemdrive%\Users\victim_user\AppData\ 
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• P1-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls\CustomLocale\en-US 
• P2-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls 
• P4-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control 
 
 
Figure 6: The Impact of Bot on the Registry 
 
Values for Trojan 
 It is notable during analysis that modifications of few keys are higher in the Trojan as compared to 
malware, the details of these are as follows 
• P18 – HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer 
• P2 - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls 
• P19 – %Systemdrive%\Windows\INF\ 
• P17-%Systemdrive%\Users\victim_user\AppData\ 
• P1-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls\CustomLocale\en-US 
• P2-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Nls 
• P4-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control 
• P20-%Systemdrive%\Windows\Globalization\Sorting\sortdefault.nls 
 
 
Figure 7: The Impact of Trojan on the Registry 
The analysis of the charts shows that Bot and Trojan have similar values. Also the following locations 
tend to be higher: P18, P19, and P17, P1 in both bots and Trojan. 
Values for Worm 
• P18 – HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer 
• P17-%Systemdrive%\Users\victim_user\AppData\ 
• P8-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ 
• P13-HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ 
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• P4-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control 
• P21-%Systemdrive%\ 
• P20-%Systemdrive%\Windows\Globalization\Sorting\sortdefault.nls 
 
 
Figure 8: The Impact of worm on the Registry 
From the empirical analysis, it has been identified that modification of keys P18 
(HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer) and P17(-
%Systemdrive%\Users\victim_user\AppData\) tends to be higher in all three classes for e.g. Bots, Worms, and 
Trojans thus we can conclude that these two keys are of great importance for forensic investigator.  
Values for Cleanware 
The distinct thing about this research is that forensic investigator will not only able to find the 
compromised system on the basis of aforementioned values but he will be also able to distinguish 
between clean systems if below-mentioned keys will be taken in consideration. 
• P45 – %systemdrive%\Program Files\Software_name\ 
• P38 - HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\ 
• Policies\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMapKey 
• P37 – HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ 
• Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\software_name 
• P40-HKEY_USERS\% account id %\Software\Adobe\ 
• P42- HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\software_name 
• P43-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\microsoft\windows\ 
• currentversion\appmanagement\arpcache\ 
• P44-%Systemdrive%\Users\Public\Documents 
• P39-HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\Software_name 
 
The modification of these keys will help the forensic investigator to consider system clean instead of 
malicious without considering the AV scan and test report which will save lots of time as well as resources of 
the system. 
                           
Figure 9: The Impact of cleanware on the Registry 
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4.3 Analysis against Operating System Version 
In comparison to the previous two sections where the identification of similarities and differences 
may assist in helping an investigator in identifying both the presence of malware and the type of 
payload, the purpose of this comparison is to identify whether any significant differences exist across 
the last three principal versions of the Windows OS. Notably, as illustrated in Figure 10, 11, 12 the 
profile exhibited against each OS version is very similar. Going beyond the current state of the art, 
this study demonstrates that Windows 10 has a very similar impact upon the previously identified 47 
registry locations as previous versions. 
Upon further examination, there are some small differences that might help identify malware in 
different versions of the OS.  
• Modification to P18 (%Systemdrive%\Windows\System32), P17 
(%Systemdrive%\Users\victim_user\AppData\) and P8 
(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\) has significant impact in all three versions 
of Windows as shown in figures 10 to 12. It has been observed that register values from P35 
to P47 are at lowest level in all three versions of Windows. 
 
 
Figure 10: Impact of Malware on the Windows 7 Registry 
 
 
Figure 11: Impact of Malware on the Windows 8 Registry 
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Figure 12: Impact of Malware on the Windows 10 Registry 
5. Discussion 
From the statistical analysis of the results, the main locations of digital assets from malicious and 
benign software were identified. Furthermore, in each type of software, in each operating system 
and in each functionality of malware, the most common locations that create digital evidence were 
recorded. In future research, this analysis could be extended to other categories of malware 
(Ransomware, Backdoor, etc.) and other forms of functionality. 
Whilst there is value to the investigator in better understanding the impact differing forms of malware 
have upon the different versions of Windows and in particular how the Registry is effected, it would 
arguably be more useful if this analysis could be applied in a manner that would provide a proactive 
approach for investigators to be able to detect and classify the type of malware present within a case 
without having to rely upon AV. This is not designed to replace or remove AV but to complement the 
approach, particularly in cases where the malware is not being detected by the AV. To this end, an 
extended experiment was conducted to determine the degree to which the impact upon the registry 
and file locations is unique to each family of malware (i.e. is it possible given the impact upon the 
registry and file locations to determine which family the malware belongs).  
The results from Appendix A were used, with the 47 locations forming the features from both 
malware and benign samples. Then a supervised pattern classification approach was selected because 
they have stronger reliability than unsupervised approaches and a dataset was easily created from 
existing malware. The samples from the three families were randomized and split into training and 
testing datasets – with differing proportions to measure the impact that training data has on the 
overall performance.  In this experiment we have used different machine learning algorithm for 
classification of cleanware and malware classes. The classes that were used are shown in the table 
below   
 
Table 4: Classes for machine learning 
Class Label 
Cleanware 0 
Malware 1 
Worm -1 
Botnet -2 
Trojan -3 
 
 
During the train, test and validate phases the efficiency and efficacy of the model was measured. 
Python was utilised and specifically IPython Jupyter notebook v 5.7.2. The Jupyter notebook is an 
open-source project which is web-based, interactive computing notebook environment which is 
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developed to support data science and scientific computing across the different platform.  The first 
experiment was performed with the label ‘Test 1’, in which train/test ratio of 80/20 was taken with 
47 features, furthermore logic regression, Neural net, Decision tree, Random forest and Boosted tree 
supervised learning algorithms were utilised and their efficiency and efficacy was measured. It was 
observed during analysis that Boosted tree algorithm was performing well with 72% accuracy as 
compared to all other classifiers as depicted in the table 5.  Furthermore, investigation was performed 
by taking training/test ratio of 70/30 to train the model, it had been found that once again Boosted 
tree outperform all other classifiers with 64% accuracy as shown in table 5. We extend our 
experiments by taking training/test ratio to 60/40 to see the impact of accuracy on the classifier, we 
found that decision tree and random forest accuracy increases to 68.4% and 67.5 % respectively, 
furthermore boosted tree accuracy decrease from 72% to 71%. 
        
From these experiments, it was observed that the best classification accuracy was produced by the 
Boosted tree with setting 80/20 as compared to other learning algorithms, moreover it was noticed 
that the Random forest, logistic regression, and decision tree classifiers accuracy increased drastically 
when we have taken 60/40 ratio but in contrast the accuracy of Boosted tree decrease from 72% to 
71% except the neural net whose accuracy remained constant.  
 
Table 5: Malware Classification Performance 
 
 
Test ID 
 
 
Train/ 
Test 
ratio 
 
 
Feature 
tested 
                                                  
Accuracy 
Logistic  
Regression 
Neural Net Decision Tree Random 
Forest 
Boosted Tree 
Test 1 80/20 47 58% 34% 62% 58% 72% 
Test 2 70/30 47 50% 33.3% 56% 64% 64.9% 
Test 3 60/40 47 58% 33% 68.4% 67.5% 71% 
Test 4 50/50 47 64% 34% 62% 62% 65% 
 
The results of this extended experiment demonstrate that modeling the impact that malware has 
upon the registry and hard disk would be a useful approach to detecting the type of malware family. 
This type of modeling is far faster than traditional AV software and could be applied either as a 
standalone tool or integrated into existing computer forensic software as an additional forensic 
analysis. It also has the advantage over AV tools in that, once trained, it does not need to be 
continually updated to reflect new signatures (which can be hourly for some tools) – merely 
periodically updated to reflect the general trends in malware composition. Furthermore, the 
approach could find applications in host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS) or intrusion 
protection systems (HIPS) as well as vulnerability scanners. 
6. Conclusion 
The paper has undertaken an investigation into the impact that three core types of malware have 
upon different versions of the Windows OS – specifically targeting the Registry. Whilst previous 
research has presented the impact of limited volumes of malware upon the Registry, this is the first 
study to utilize a large volume of malware across the three core types (Bot, Trojan and Worm) along 
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with clean samples. The results from this analysis largely confirm previous studies but provide a 
greater granularity as to the impact based on the different types of malware. This study has also 
extended the prior work by including Windows 10 and evidencing that it has overall a similar impact 
profile on the Registry as previous versions of the software. 
The results have shown that it is possible to accelerate a digital forensics analysis through a 
preliminary analysis of the registry, the modified timestamps and the use of machine learning or deep 
learning. Targeting these 47 registry locations can provide a first indication to the digital forensics 
examiner on whether or not malware is present, but also the type across all common versions of the 
Windows OS.  
This type of analysis has several key advantages over existing approaches: it is faster to scan and 
identify than AV, it is able to detect and classify new malware prior to AV signatures being developed, 
it does not need frequent updating and can be built into existing tools with applications in both the 
forensic and security fields. 
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Appendix A. Malware Dynamic Analysis Locations (1-34) that forensics artifacts have been recorded during dynamic analysis for each of 180 samples 
(Malware [p1-p34] and clean [p35-p47]) of worm, Bot and Trojan (table 1,2,& 3),clean (table 4) and for the three Windows operating systems (table 5,6 & 7)  
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Table 1 
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Table 2 
 Cleanware 
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Locations for windows 7 
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Table 6 
Locations for windows 8 
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Table 7 
Locations for windows 10 
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